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Can aU.S. District Court Enjoin aDefendant
from Transferring or Assigning Assets Held Outside
of the Court's Jurisdiction?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 311-314. © 1999 American Bar Association.
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ISSUE
The question is whether a United
States district court may issue a
preliminary injunction prohibiting a
defendant from transferring or
assigning assets unrelated to the
plaintiffs underlying claim and held
outside of the court's jurisdiction in
order to ensure that funds will be
available to satisfy a potential
money judgment.
FACTS
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A.
is a Mexican holding company that
constructs and operates roadways.
From 1990 to 1994, Grupo participated in the Mexican government's
program to develop an intercity
highway network. Under this program, the Mexican government
granted concessions to build and
operate toll roads to companies willing to arrange private financing for
the construction of the roads.
Because of economic problems, the
revenues from toll road traffic fell
below anticipated levels.

In order to retire more than S100
million of high-interest Mexican
bank debt and to secure working
capital to fund ongoing operations,
in 1994 Grupo sold institutional
investors $250 million of unsecured
notes due in 2001. The notes are
"unconditionally and irrevocably"
guaranteed by five Grupo subsidiaries. Eleven United States
investment funds ("Investors") purchased approximately S75 million of
the notes.
Three years later, Grupo experienced serious financial difficulty. It
expressed substantial doubt that it
could continue as a going concern.
In August 1997, Grupo failed to
make the interest payment on the
notes. The guarantors also failed to
set up and meet their obligations.
As a result of this default, Investors
caused acceleration of the principal.
A few days later, the Mexican government came to the rescue by
(Continued on Page 312)
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implementing the Toll Road Rescue
Program. Mexico promised to issue
government-guaranteed Toll Road
Notes to Grupo and other toll-road
operators to reimburse them for
unpaid construction receivables and
expenses. In return for the Toll
Road Notes, the Mexican government would eventually take over
ownership and operation of the toll
roads. In its third-quarter 1997
financial statement, Grupo disclosed
that it expected to receive $309 million in Toll Road Notes.
In addition to the money Grupo
owed the Investors, it owed more
than $450 million to other creditors. The five largest creditors were
the Mexican government, numerous
Mexican banks, additional Mexican
financial institutions, trade creditors, and terminated employees.
Because the Mexican government's
program would not fully alleviate
its financial difficulties, Grupo
began to restructure its debt, reduce
costs, and seek additional equity
contributions.
In October 1997, Grupo issued a
press release stating that during the
first nine months of 1997 it had revenues of $119 million, but an
expected loss of more than $800
million. After totaling its assets and
debts, Grupo had a negative net
worth of $214 million.
After discovering that Grupo had
assigned over $100 million in Toll
Road Notes to settle other obligations, Investors filed suit on Dec.
12, 1997, in U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York.
Investors alleged that Grupo had
defaulted on its obligation under the
notes. They sought damages for
Grupo's breach of its contractual
obligations and a preliminary
injunction restraining Grupo from
assigning the Toll Road Notes.

On the day before the hearing on
the preliminary injunction, an officer of Grupo revealed that Grupo
had assigned approximately $250
million in Toll Road Notes to the
Mexican banks and other creditors.
The district court granted the preliminary injunction under Rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, restraining Grupo and
the guarantors from dissipating,
transferring, conveying, or otherwise encumbering the Investors'
right to receive or benefit from the
issuance of the Toll Road Notes. The
district court found that Investors
would almost certainly succeed on
their breach of contract claims
against Grupo and that without the
injunction they faced an irreparable
injury, since Grupo's financial condition and dissipation of assets
would frustrate any judgment
recovered.
Grupo appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,
arguing that the district court was
powerless under Rule 65 to enjoin
the use of a specific asset unless the
plaintiff claims an equitable interest
in the asset. Grupo asserted that
Rule 64 is the only procedural
mechanism to prevent a litigant
from concealing or transferring
assets in order to frustrate a potential judgment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's decision, holding
that the mere fact that the property
lies outside the boundaries of New
York state did not render the court
powerless. It explained that if the
court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant and if use of the
injunctive power is appropriate, the
court may order a defendant to
bring the assets to the court or
restrain the use of the assets. The
court held that the district court's
finding that Grupo planned to use
the Toll Road Notes to satisfy

Mexican creditors to the exclusion
of Investors supported a finding that
the investors would suffer irreparable injury absent preliminary
injunctive relief. 143 F.3d 688 (2d
Cir. 1998). It recognized that the
court could not have granted an
injunction under Rule 64 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
because under New York law a preliminary injunction is unavailable
in an action for a sum of money
only. The United States Supreme
Court granted Grupo's petition for
certiorari.
After Grupo failed in its appeal, the
district court entered final judgment
in favor of Investors and against
Grupo in the amount of
$82,444,259. The court converted
the preliminary injunction into a
permanent injunction pending satisfaction of the award of money.
CASE ANALYSIS
Under Rule 64 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, "all remedies
providing for the seizure of the person or property for the purpose of
securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the
action are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the state in
which the district court is held."
Available remedies include arrest,
attachment, garnishment, "and
other corresponding or equivalent
remedies." Injunctive relief may be
granted under Rule 64 if authorized
by the applicable state law.
According to the Second Circuit,
the law of New York does not allow
the use of a preliminary injunction
in an action for a sum of money
only.
Rule 65 establishes the procedure
for securing preliminary injunctive
relief in civil actions. The purpose
of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo between the
parties pending a final determina-
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tion of the merits. The Supreme
Court has upheld the use of Rule
65.
Grupo argues that the preliminary
injunction interfered with its efforts
to restructure its debt and substantially impaired its ability to continue its operations in the ordinary
course of business. Grupo points out
that, if the Court of Appeals' decision is reversed, it will be entitled to
damages to the extent that it can
show harm resulting from the
wrongful issuance of the injunction.
Grupo stresses that it has no assets
or operations in the United States.
According to Grupo, the inherent
powers of the district courts do not
provide a basis for the injunction.
Grupo asserts that it is exclusively
for Congress to extend the inherent
powers of the federal courts beyond
those that existed at common law.
Investors disagree, contending that
since the court had personal jurisdiction over the parties, it had the
power to issue a preliminary injunction against Grupo to restrain it
from dissipating its principal assets
pending the outcome of the litigation, in order to preserve the status
quo and protect the court's ability
to render an effective judgment.
Noting that the district court's jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship, Grupo argues that a federal district court sitting in diversity
must rely exclusively on state law
remedies to preserve a defendant's
assets to secure a potential money
judgment. It declares that New York
law does not authorize the remedy
provided by the district court.
According to Grupo, permitting a
plaintiff to obtain an injunction in
federal court under these circumstances would mean that a plaintiff
could obtain a remedy in federal
court that would be unavailable to a
plaintiff in some state courts.

Even if state law governs the
issuance of injunctions by federal
courts in diversity cases, Investors
say that the injunction entered
against Grupo is consistent with
applicable New York law. In any
event, Investors insist that federal
law governs the issuance of preliminary injunctions in federal court.
Investors argue that a district court
has the power to issue a preliminary
injunction preventing a creditor's
use and dissipation of certain assets
where there is a threat of the
debtor's insolvency or threat of its
dissipation of assets. They stress
that in this case money damages
would be an inadequate remedy
because of the impending insolvency of the defendant and the defendant's engaging in a pattern of
secreting or dissipating assets to
avoid judgment. Investors claim that
preliminary injunctions are necessary in cases such as this to prevent
a creditor from transferring or
assigning assets in order to frustrate
collection of monetary damages.
Investors argue that Grupo's appeal
is moot because the district court
entered a permanent injunction into
which the temporary injunction had
merged. According to Investors,
Grupo has no damages claim for
being wrongfully enjoined because it
lost on the merits and voluntarily
abandoned its appeal from the permanent injunction.
In an amicus curiae (friend of the
court) brief, the Dominican
Republic asserts that the Second
Circuit's decision is a serious intrusion by the United States courts
into the sovereign rights of other
nations, particularly their rights to
enforce their own debtor-creditor
systems over property owned by
their citizens within their territory.
The Dominican Republic claims that
exercising judicial control over
extraterritorial assets in the context

of a financially troubled foreign
company threatens to conflict with
local authority and reorganization
systems.
In another amicus brief, however,
the Securities Industry Association
disagrees, asserting that the issue
here is the power to issue an injunction. It asserts that considerations
of "comity" bear only on whether
such an injunction should be issued
in a particular case. (Comity is the
recognition that one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience
and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under
the protection of its law.)
SIGNIFICANCE
A preliminary injunction is a form
of "equitable relief" ordering someone to do something or to refrain
from doing something. Even though
there no longer are separate law and
equity courts, and there is only one
form of civil action under the federal rules, injunctive relief continues
to be viewed as "extraordinary," and
courts are reluctant to issue an
injunction if the claimant can
secure adequate relief by an award
of money damages.
While the Supreme Court has never
expressly sanctioned the use of a
preliminary injunction to secure a
potential money judgment, it has
recognized that under certain circumstances a district court may
issue a preliminary injunction
restraining a defendant from disposing of assets. In Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311
U.S. 282 (1940), plaintiffs sought an
order enjoining the defendant from
disposing of any assets pending the
outcome of their action for fraudulent misrepresentation. The
Supreme Court sustained the grant(Continued on Page 314)
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ing of the injunction holding that
the injunction was a reasonable
measure to preserve the status quo
pending final determination of the
case. The Court in Deckert upheld
the use of a preliminary injunction
to preserve a final equitable remedy
of restitution or constructive trust.
In De Beers ConsolidatedMines,
Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212
(1945), the Supreme Court held
that a motion for a preliminary
injunction restraining defendants
from transferring assets outside the
United States should have been
denied because the preliminary
relief sought dealt with a matter
lying wholly outside the issues in
the suit where there was no possibility of an eventual money
judgment.
More recently, in United States v.
FirstNational City Bank, 379 U.S.
378 (1965), the Court upheld a preliminary injunction in a suit seeking
payment of back taxes. Relying on
statutory authority for the use of
injunctions in suits seeking payment of back taxes, the Court stated
that once personal jurisdiction of a
party is obtained, the district court
has authority to order it to freeze
property under its control.
Several circuits have held that a district court may use a preliminary
injunction to prevent the dissipation
of assets pending outcome of a case.
See, e.g., Teradyne Inc. v. Mostek
Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986);
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson &
Co., 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990),
United States ex rel. Taxpayers
Against Fraudv. Singer Co., 889
F.2d 1327, 1330 (4th Cir. 1989);
EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Lilly, 840
F.2d 333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 825 (1988), Airlines
Reporting Corp. v. Barry, 825 F.2d
1220 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Estate of

Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126
(1995).
However, other circuits have held
that a preliminary injunction may
not issue to prohibit transferring or
conveying assets unrelated to a
plaintiffs claim. See, e.g., United
States v. Cohen, 152 F.3d 321 (4th
Cir. 1998); In re Fredeman
Litigation, 843 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.
1988); Home-Stake Prod. Co. v.
Talon Petroleum, 907 F.2d 1012
(10th Cir. 1990); Rosen v. Cascade
Int'l, Inc., 21 F.3d 1520 (11th Cir.
1994).
The Supreme Court will have to
resolve this split among the circuits.
If the Court upholds the Second
Circuit, it will become more difficult
I for defendants to transfer or assign
assets in order to hinder or defeat
collection of a judgment for damages. On the other hand, such a
decision should take into account
the practical implications of preventing a defendant from using its
property for an indefinite period. It
is possible that, in some cases, such
an injunction could prevent a defendant from restructuring its final
obligations or paying debts owed to
third parties in order to continue as
a viable enterprise.
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For Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
S.A., et al. (Richard A. Mescon
(212) 309-6000)
For Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., et al.
(Drew S. Days III (202) 887-1500)

AMIcus BRIEFS
In Support of Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, S.A., et al.
The Dominican Republic (Daniel
W. Krasner (212) 545-4600)
In Support of Alliance Bond Fund,
Inc., et al.
The Securities Industry
Association and the Emerging
Markets Traders Association
(Richard A. Rosen (212) 373-3000)

If the Court does not uphold the
Second Circuit's decision, it could
increase the risk and costs associated with transnational investments
and create a disincentive to investments in entities whose assets are
overseas. This could seriously harm
the global marketplace and United
States investors who invest in those
markets by depriving investors of an
effective remedy.
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